

IKHWANI SHIISM

**INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL BASIS
OF 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION**



**INFORMATION MARKAZ-E-WILAYAT-E-ALI
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اخوانی شیعیت 1979ء کے ایرانی انقلاب کی فکری اور سماجی بنیاد

IKHWANI SHIISM INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL BASIS OF 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Shia Islamism: Intellectual and Social Foundations of the Iranian Revolution of 1979

In the modern era, the term "terrorist organization" has been coined to describe organized groups that, instead of providing evidence and preaching, employ killing and terrorism for the attainment of political goals. Rather than uniting people of all classes through peaceful means, they seek to establish dominance by instilling fear. This ideology first emerged prominently in Italy and Germany under the name of Fascism. Drawing inspiration from this, Savarkar and Golwalkar in India presented the theories of Hindutva and Hindu nationalism. Among Muslims, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt adopted this ideology, attempting to cloak it in the garb of Islam, giving rise to organizations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

These same individuals are also the architects of the recent wave of politically motivated Takfiri discord, which is an echo of the ideology of Ibn Taymiyyah. Maulana Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, by misinterpreting divinity, labeled most Muslims as victims of ignorance and conditioned becoming a Muslim anew on adhering to their Fascist ideology. They view religion in the form of a state. The government established in Iran under the banner of Vilayat-e-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) is not fundamentally related to the old concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih in Shia Islam. Instead, it reflects the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami.

The influence of these thinkers, particularly Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Maududi, has been profound among them. They, influenced

by the racial Fascism movements in Italy and Germany before the Second World War, formulated a religious Fascism theory, disseminated in Iran under the title of absolute Vilayat-e-Faqih. In the Twelver Shia tradition, after the emergence of doctrinal and ideological schools of thought, a third school of thought has emerged, known as "Ikhwanized Shi'ism." This article delves into the origins and evolution of Ikhwanized Shi'ism.

Historical Meanings of the Term "Vilayat-e-Faqih"

According to Shia beliefs, an Islamic government can only be established by the presence of an infallible Imam. In the absence of the Imam, an Islamic government cannot exist. However, efforts should continuously be made through democratic means to improve the state of affairs, based on the Quranic injunctions of enjoining good and forbidding evil. Compliance with the infallible Imam should not involve an element of coercion, and individuals follow him out of the strength of their faith.

Imamate does not imply a specific system of governance because a system essentially reflects the organized nature of a community, and the conditions of a community change in every era. For example, an industrial society and an agrarian society cannot have the same system. However, the Imam remains constant. Shia Muslims understand Imamatus as an integral part of the principles of religion in a way that, without it, an individual remains a Muslim but the Islamic social system cannot be established. This understanding is derived from verses and sayings that use terms like Wali, Mawla, Imam, or Amir. In Arabic, "Hakam" means a judge. In the early days of Islam, rulers were called Wali, Mawla, or Amir, while judges were referred to as Hakam or Qazi.

According to Shia beliefs, Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) explicitly designated Hazrat Ali as Wali, Mawla, and Amir on

numerous occasions during his lifetime and before his demise. However, Imam Mahdi did not appoint anyone as Mawla, Wali, or ruler. Even the four deputies, appointed by Imam Mahdi, did not have the right to rule. The Quran prohibits the appointment of clerics as lords (Surah At-Tawbah, verse 31). In the context of Islamic jurisprudence, the scholars are called the heirs of the prophets, but the Imams are not referred to as heirs. Hence, their role is limited to the propagation of truth.

In the Shia jurisprudential tradition, the term "Vilayat-e-Faqih" is an ancient term, but it does not have any basis in the Quran and Hadith. Therefore, it is not related to beliefs. The term was coined to address matters related to community welfare. The objective was to grant authority to a knowledgeable jurist during the occultation of the Imam to spend the funds of the Imam for the welfare of the community. It also included overseeing issues such as justice, managing the properties of orphans or mentally disabled individuals, and other matters of jurisprudential governance. Activities related to public service in jurisprudence are also termed as "Amoor-e-Hisbiya." This form of guardianship did not imply governance because clerical governance is inconsistent with the Shia interpretation of the Quran and Hadith.

From the First Republic in Asia to Pahlavi Dynasty: A Journey through Political Transformations

The wave of republican revolutions reached America in 1775 and France in 1789. The first republican revolution in Asia occurred in 1907 in Iran, led by the notable scholar Aghund Khurasani. He authored the fundamental book "Kifayat al-Usul," outlining the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Khurasani asserted that due to the absence of the infallible Imam during the occultation period, an Islamic government is not feasible. Therefore, secular republicanism,

founded on the principles of enjoining good and forbidding evil, is preferable to minimize oppression.

Khurasani emphasized that the right to govern, manage public affairs, solve societal issues, and make important decisions is exclusively reserved for the infallible Imam appointed by Allah, similar to the eras of the prophets, Imams, and the future Imam Mahdi. Without the absolute authority of the infallible, any rule would be considered non-Islamic. During the occultation, two types of non-Islamic governments might emerge: a just republican system based on the rule of the knowledgeable and a tyrannical regime where an autocrat assumes absolute power.

In 1921, Reza Khan Pahlavi rose to power in Iran, ending the brief period of republicanism. Although he curtailed the freedom of political discourse and imposed restrictions on women's attire, Reza Khan initiated reforms such as eliminating feudalism, establishing educational institutions, hospitals, railways, and roads, and developing the country's infrastructure. However, he also faced criticism for limiting civil liberties.

In contrast, in 1923, in Egypt, the Salafi scholar Muhammad Rashid Rida wrote a book titled "Al-Khilafah Aw Al-Imamah Al-Adhima" (The Caliphate or the Great Imamate), advocating for a structured state under the concept of Khilafah. This idea led to the establishment of the organization "Ikhwan al-Muslimeen" (Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928, which gained popularity not only in Egypt but also in Iraq.

The political landscape in Iran underwent further changes during World War II when British and Soviet forces occupied the country in 1941. Reza Khan was replaced by his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who became the Shah of Iran. However, the wave of republicanism resurged, and in 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh

nationalized the oil industry, leading to tensions with Britain. In 1953, with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom, a coup overthrew Mossadegh, restoring Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power.

This turbulent period marked Iran's oscillation between monarchy and republicanism, reflecting the geopolitical influences of major world powers.

"The Emergence of Shia Militancy and Rebellion against Marjaiyat (Religious Authority)"

Syed Mujtaba Mir Lohi, also known as Nawab Safavi, a sixteen-year-old student, after passing matriculation in 1942, went to Najaf for religious education. However, influenced by the propaganda of the Muslim Brotherhood, he left his religious studies in 1944. In 1945, Nawab Safavi established an organization called Fidaian-e-Islam to bring the Brotherhood's style of caliphate to Iran. The organization was responsible for the assassination of a government judge, Ahmad Kasravi (died 1946), Federal Minister Abdul Hussein Hazir (died 1949), and Prime Minister Ali Razmara (died 1951). In 1951, Nawab Safavi authored a booklet titled "The Program of the Islamic Revolution Fidaian Islam," introducing Islamic and fascist ideals to Iran. In this booklet, he advocated for the elimination of interest-based economic systems, arrangements for the poor in terms of shelter and clothing, discussions on every good deed every hundred days, restrictions on films and songs, training of memorizers and muezzins, restrictions on wearing Western clothing (pants and shirts), abolishing mixed-gender education, strict measures against thieves and smugglers, and public flogging of adulterers. He also declared that every office should display both the Iranian and Islamic flags.

However, his booklet lacked any understanding or insight into national constitution, budgeting, managing national treasury, business laws, the educational system for modern sciences, transportation, defense, and public health. It reflected his ignorance and detachment from the real issues facing the national state. Considering he only had a matriculation degree from a religious scholar, the expectations should not have been high.

At that time, Iranian politics had democratic and communist factions, led by Ahmad Qavam and the Tudeh Party, respectively. Besides, there were other political groups, including those led by religious zealots like Ayatollah Kashani and Dr. Mossadegh's Iran Party. In 1951, Iranian Prime Minister Dr. Mossadegh successfully nationalized the oil industry, which was under British control, leading to opposition from both the United States and the UK. Facing pressure, Mossadegh imposed restrictions on music and mandated the hijab for women. Ayatollah Kashani, who had supported Nawab Safavi until then, offered financial support to Fidaian Islam.

In 1953, the United States intervened against Dr. Mossadegh, enforcing martial law and restoring powers to the Shah. Fidaian Islam celebrated this development and asked the Shah to impose restrictions on music and enforce the hijab. The Shah, considering democracy and theocracy as two enemies, thought that dealing with the Brotherhood would be easy. Just as initially, Jamal Abdul Nasser had used Sayyid Qutb for his purposes, similarly, the Shah utilized Nawab Safavi against democracy and religious authority. Fidaian Islam targeted highly educated scholars, labeling them as traitors, unfaithful, neglectful of religious duties, and placed marjas (religious authorities) in a blind and idolatrous position. If we examine, the same attitude is observed in traditional Sunni scholars regarding the Jamaat-e-Islami of Maulana Maududi and the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda of Sayyid Qutb.

When Ayatollah Sayyid Hussein Burujerdi questioned Nawab Safavi about what service they were rendering to Islam by using violence and spreading fear, Nawab Safavi replied, "We loot people's wealth with the intention of borrowing and when the Islamic system is established, we will return the looted money." When Ayatollah Burujerdi decided to expel a student associated with Fidaian Islam from the Qom Seminary, supporters, including Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini, opposed the decision, saying, "These young people have frightened the marjas into submission."

Nawab Safavi's enmity towards marjaiyat (religious authority) started from the beginning, and he had adopted the approach of rebellion. Seeing a watermelon, he wanted it to ripen quickly. In research, logical principles must be followed before expressing an opinion, and thorough investigation is required into all aspects of the matter. If the demands of research are not met, avoiding expressing an opinion is necessary. On the other hand, mysticism always opposes independent reasoning. Before expressing an opinion, one must understand the thoughts generated in the mind, which can never be free from error for an ordinary person.

Nawab Safavi had a disagreement with Ayatollah Burujerdi, as the latter believed in bringing together Shia and Sunni in terms of proximity of sects, tolerance, and dialogue, while Nawab Safavi inclined towards the Brotherhood's style of unity of the Muslim nation. Like Maulana Maududi, Nawab Safavi also considered the unity of the ummah, without distinguishing between sects, as innovation (bid'ah) - meaning establishing a fascist party that would govern all Muslims according to its own will.

In 1954, when the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser, in 1955, Fidaian Islam tried to assassinate Iranian Minister Hussein Ala, but the attempt was unsuccessful. Nawab Safavi and his three companions were

sentenced to death when they were 31 years old, and at that time, perhaps there was no need for them anymore.

In Egypt, Sayyid Qutb was imprisoned and executed in 1966. Shia religious authorities supported democracy and reforms. Prominent among them were Ayatollahs Sayyid Hussein Burujerdi and Sayyid Mohsen Hakim. After them, Ayatollahs Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Khoei, Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, Sayyid Mohammad Hadi Milani, Sayyid Mohammad Reza Golpayegani, and Ayatollah Marashi Najafi followed. All of them were supporters of democracy.

Sufism's Devotee in the Arena of Politics

This was the environment in which a Sufi follower, Maulana Syed Ruhollah Khomeini, shaped his political ideology. Until 1950, he remained deeply engrossed in the Sufi teachings of Ibn Arabi and Mulla Sadra, as evidenced by his numerous writings on the subject. Sufism is often misunderstood and condemned by the followers of Shia Islam, and many statements of the Imams criticize it. Modern science has also debunked Sufism. After the death sentence of Nawab Safavi, Syed Ruhollah Khomeini raised the banner of the Shia opposition. In 1963, he delivered a speech against the government, leading to riots in Qom. When he was arrested by the police, Ayatollah Shariatmadari opposed the arrest of Khomeini, despite the disagreement of Ayatollah Hadi Milani, to save his life. This marked the first use of the concept of "marja'iyat" to protect someone from the death penalty. During the Pahlavi era, the constitution included a clause stating that religious authorities could not be sentenced. Khomeini was sent to Turkey and later to Najaf. In the publications of the Islamic Jamiat in Lahore, an October 1963 edition of "Struggle between Religion and Secularism in Iran" contained an extremist article, prompting a protest from the Iranian ambassador. The reality was that only three people were injured due to police baton charges. In 1965, Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur

was assassinated. In Najaf, Khomeini presented his plan to Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim, who said, "You cannot implement Islam, but because of you, hundreds of thousands will be killed. Who will be accountable for this blood?" Disheartened, Khomeini began working on jurisprudence and provided a complete commentary on Ayatollah Abul-Hasan Isfahani's book "Wasilat al-Najah," published as "Tahrir al-Wasilah." His goal was to enter the institution of "marja'iiyyat" and politically exploit the position. However, at that time in Najaf, Ayatollah Khomeini was the parrot who spoke, having excelled in exegesis, hadith, theology, jurisprudence, and principles of jurisprudence. Therefore, Khomeini was not very successful in attracting students at that time.

Usage of Maulana Maududi and Sayyid Qutb during the Cold War

The Cold War had come to an end between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States, in its opposition to communism, collaborated with Saudi Arabia to propagate Salafi politics and create non-aligned Islamic systems of thought. Utilizing the platform of the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, specific political ideologies of Sheikh Rashid Rida, Maulana Maududi, and the intellectual of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, were promoted. These ideas spread to Iran and Iraq, influencing some Shiite students.

In support of the new republican state, books of scholars such as Ayatollah Aghond Mohammad Kazem Khorasani, Ayatollah Asma'il Mahallati, and Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Naini, which were absent from stores and bookshelves, began to gain popularity. Now, books of the Muslim Brotherhood were being translated into Persian. An estimate suggests that by the 1960s, 19 books by Sayyid Qutb and his brother Mohammad Qutb were translated into Persian. It is noteworthy that during the youth of Osama bin Laden, who later became a leader of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, he was a student of

Mohammad Qutb, who fled Saudi Arabia from Egypt after his brother's execution.

Maulana Maududi was highly influenced by Syed Ahmed Barelvi, who established the Mulla Raj in Peshawar in 1827. During the Cold War, translations of Maulana Maududi's books and non-scholarly books by Ali Shariati were spreading in Iran. According to SAVAK documents, Shariati had the support of the Shah. These books are manifestly incorrect in terms of historical facts and statistics. However, due to emotional appeals and vivid language, they continued to provide easy but inaccurate answers to challenging questions for semi-literate individuals.

This was a time when, due to agricultural reforms in Iran, a large number of people emerged from poverty and joined the middle class, moving towards urbanization. They needed friends during their transition away from the Brotherhood and towards urban life, and they found these in the form of radical organizations. They also needed immediate answers to questions, which the superficial books provided (10).

Impact of Sayyid Qutb on Ayatollah Khamenei

In the realm of Persian-speaking translators, there was a young man named Sayyid Ali Khamenei, who hailed from Mashhad. During his youth, he was deeply influenced by the writings of Navvab Safavi. He left his seminary studies and translated three volumes of Sayyid Qutb's commentary "Fi Zilal al-Quran" and two other books, "The Future of This Religion" and "Islam and the Challenges of Civilization." It's important to note that Sayyid Qutb was not a scholar; he was an author prone to many errors, and several notable scholars, including Allama al-Albani, criticized him. Similar to Maulana Maududi, who was more of a prolific writer than a profound Scholar.

In January 1966, Ali Khamenei contacted Maulana Maududi and requested three of his books: "The Four Basic Terms of Islamic Expressions," "The Islamic Way of Life," and "Islamic Constitution." At that time, Khamenei was twenty-five years old. This period coincided with the time when Ayatollah Sayyid Hadi Milani used to give lectures in Mashhad. However, there was a group of young boys who created disturbances during his lectures, following the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Maududi.

In 1968, Maulana Naimatullah Saleh wrote a book titled "Shaheed-e-Javed," providing the same interpretation of the events of Karbala as Maulana Maududi did in "Khilafat o Malookiat." He claimed that Imam Hussain's goal was to establish Caliphate, while according to Shia beliefs, Imam Hussain's purpose was to save the religion. The religious authorities deemed this book misleading, and Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani responded with a book titled "Shaheed-e-Aagah" to counter it.

Iraq-Iran Conflict and the Chess Game

In the 1970s, a conflict was brewing between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud) river, a border region. During this time, Saddam Hussein, who was then the vice president of Iraq, sought refuge in the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, as Reza Shah in Iran was supporting separatism among the Kurds in Iraq. Saddam received arms from the Iraqi embassy in Pakistan and carried out operations in Balochistan with the help of Iranian helicopters.

Despite tensions, Ayatollah Khomeini did not openly criticize the Iraqi government during this period. In 1974, Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim and later Ayatollah Khoi faced opposition and even armed attacks from the Iraqi government, including the Badr Brigade led by Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr. However, Khomeini

did not take any actions against the Iraqi government at the time of these incidents.

In 1974, Ayatollah Khomeini dramatically altered the traditional concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) by incorporating the political ideas of Muhammad Rashid Rida and Sayyid Qutb into it. This amalgamation was presented in a book titled "Velayat-e Faqih ya Hukumat-e Islami" ("Guardianship of the Jurist or Islamic Government"). Later, it was commonly referred to as "Velayat-e Motlaqeh-e Faqih" ("Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist"). This modification can be seen as influenced by the writings of Rida and Qutb, especially considering that it resembles the content of Reza Shah's book "Al-Khilafah."

In 1977, Ayatollah Khomeini released a book titled "Wilayat al-Faqih ya Hukumat al-Islam," essentially based on the ideas presented by Rashid Rida and Sayyid Qutb. This book criticized the scholars who opposed his theories. It bears some resemblance to the book "Al-Khilafah" by Muhammad Rashid Rida. In this book, Khomeini somewhat weakly presented his arguments and accused scholars who disagreed with him, encouraging his followers to criticize and even confront the senior clerics.

In 1977, Ayatollah Khomeini's representative in Isfahan, Ayatollah Seyed Abolhassan Shamsabadi, was abducted and murdered for delivering speeches against the ideological theories of the Islamic revolutionaries. This incident is reminiscent of the murder of Maulana Asad in 2007, who opposed the ideology of the Taliban in Peshawar.

Ayatollah Khomeini passed away on June 18, 1977, due to a heart attack caused by excessive smoking. His death led to a succession crisis within the Islamic revolutionary movement. The People's Mujahedin of Iran, initially a supporter of Khomeini, later formed a

criminal group under the leadership of Masoud Rajavi. In August 1978, Khomeini's supporters set fire to the Rex Cinema in Abadan, leading to the death of around four hundred people.

Mulla Naraqi and Syed Ahmed Barelvi's Experiences and Lessons Not Learned

Ayatollah Khomeini was not the first person among the Shia to discuss the concept of the rule of the jurisprudent (Velayat-e Faqih). Before him, another Sufi, Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829), had presented the authority of jurisprudents akin to kingship in his book "Awa'id al-Ayyam." Naraqi based his ideas on the philosophical concepts of Plato's "Philosopher King" and the notion of an ideal society in More's "Utopia." However, this was during a time when modern society had not yet emerged. Therefore, his concept of theocratic rule was in the sense of personal governance, and the present absolute rule of the jurisprudent has only a nominal resemblance to it.

Interestingly, Mulla Naraqi, unaware of the changes happening in the world, declared a senseless war against a neighboring country (Russia) in 1826. This resulted in Iran facing humiliation, losing territories, and enduring the disgraceful terms of a peace agreement. This lack of awareness of worldly changes exemplifies the dangers of blind adherence to Sufi doctrines, which Naraqi represented.

During the same era, in the Indian subcontinent, a Wahhabi Sufi named Syed Ahmed Barelvi and his devoted disciple Shah Ismail Dehlvi (d. 1831) established a reign of religious scholars in Peshawar in 1827. However, their rule brought nothing but destruction. Syed Ahmed Barelvi, too, used to speak about mystical matters, and he was also referred to as an Imam, with orders to kill those who opposed him.

In the political Sufism of Mulla Naraqi's time, another incident occurred in the Indian subcontinent. In 1827, Syed Ahmed Bareilvi and his disciple Shah Ismail Dehlvi established a government in Peshawar, which brought nothing but devastation. Syed Ahmed Bareilvi also used to talk about mystical matters, and he, too, was referred to as an Imam. Orders to kill those who opposed him were part of their political Sufism. Shah Ismail Dehlvi presented his political Sufism in his book "Mansab-e Imamate" ("Position of Imamate").

Ironically, in the 1860s, followers of these individuals, including Shah Abdul Aziz Dehlvi, ended up aligning with Deobandis and Ahl-e Hadith. Shah Abdul Aziz Dehlvi, who was a disciple of the renowned Sufi Mullah Sadra, wrote a book titled "Sharh-e Mulla Sadra" ("Explanation of Mulla Sadra"). His followers, in the 1860s, found themselves associating with the Deobandis and Ahl-e Hadith, marking the beginning of extremism in the region.

These historical examples underscore the dangers of mystical influence on politics, where Sufi leaders, despite their spiritual teachings, often became agents of destruction and violence, serving as a warning against the blind adherence to such ideologies.

Effects of Urbanization

During the 1970s, Iran experienced a significant demographic shift as people were moving away from rural areas to urban centers. The middle class was growing rapidly, but there was a lack of academic freedom and open discussions on political ideologies. In 1974, OPEC announced a fourfold increase in oil prices, leading to a rapid pace of urban development in Iran. Thousands of students were sent to Western countries to learn new sciences, and by 1976, 47% of Iran's population had urbanized.

Tehran's population had reached five million, and one out of every ten Iranians had a car. However, the scientific expansion was limited, and there were high expectations. In urban youth, ideologies like communism and Islamism were spreading rapidly. Young people who migrated from rural areas to cities were eager to establish stable relationships quickly due to the low quality of life in rural regions.

Wilhelm Reich, a renowned psychologist, argued that sexual repression is deeply connected with fascism, as sexual dissatisfaction leads to frustration, and logical thinking becomes challenging for such individuals. Some political groups took advantage of the frustration of sexually dissatisfied youth by promising interest-free loans and pledging to meet all essential needs after marriage, resulting in a rapid rise in their popularity.

In any case, it was the irresponsible youth of colleges and universities who played a significant role in preparing for the Iranian Revolution. The threat of being incorporated into the Soviet Union was thwarted by signing friendship treaties with Algeria in 1977, which led to the Shah promising to end the shelter for Iraqi Kurds and Saddam pledging to terminate Khomeini's asylum.

Khomeini went to France, and Western media outlets, including the BBC, began broadcasting his messages and interviews. The year 1979 marked the beginning of protests against the Shah in Iran. As the Shah saw the looming threat of civil war, he appointed Shapour Bakhtiar as the Prime Minister and left the country. It's estimated that around 11% of Iran's population was on the streets during the protests.

To comprehend the situation, imagine if 300,000 people were on the streets of Islamabad and 2 million in Lahore and Karachi, all with silent support. In this scenario, the understanding of the state of affairs becomes clearer.

The Concept of Unity: Intolerance and Oppression towards Dissenters

The followers of the concept of Islamic unity resort to deceit in order to impose their views. The ideological foundations of Islamic unity are considered logically weak, making it difficult for these individuals to tolerate dissent beyond a certain point. After the revolution in Iran in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini deviated from the republican ideals of the religious authorities and implemented a system influenced by Rashid Rida and Maulana Maududi.

Information about communist hideouts, obtained by American intelligence agencies, reached religious militants, enabling them to locate and deal with their enemies. The sudden deaths of Ayatollah Taleghani and Ayatollah Montazeri in Iran had a profound impact on the formation of the new state. Questions persist about why Ayatollah Montazeri, in the atmosphere of internal conflict, was not provided with adequate security. Perhaps it was because he wanted to see the religious leader in the form of a jurist rather than a ruler.

Ayatollah Taleghani advocated for the rights of the republic by publishing Ayatollah Naini's book, leading to an unexpected visit to the hospital. The Ambulance skipped two hospitals near his residence and took him to the third hospital, where he arrived when it was too late. The path for the followers of the Islamic movement was clear.

Maulana Syed Mohammad Bakhshiti played a significant role in giving legal shape to the concept of Velayat-e-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). During his five years in Germany, he had become familiar with the details of Hitler's fascism. When the Supreme Jurist Ayatollah Shariatmadari protested against this, he was accused of being rebellious and silenced.

Therefore, other religious authorities expressed dissatisfaction in their books, labeling absolute guardianship as invalid and limiting the authority of the religious jurist to financial matters.

In Iraq, since 1968, the ruling Ba'ath Party was inclined towards Arab racial fascism. When Saddam Hussein became the president in July 1979, he eliminated his opponents within the party by resorting to violence. The Iran-Iraq War began in September 1980, at a time when Khomeini changed his views about the Iraqi Ba'ath Party and started propagating religious fascism among the Iraqi people.

Saddam attacked Iran to avoid internal threats and killed Islamic scholars in Iraq. Khomeini began to call on Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia to join the Islamic revolution. Although during the Cold War, Saudi Arabia continued to disseminate the books of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami worldwide, the people considered the rule of the House of Saud better than the rule of Wahhabi scholars.

Khomeini referred to the Islamic Brotherhood's interpretation as the Islam of the Prophet and referred to other interpretations, whether by Shia or Sunni scholars, as American Islam. The slogans of the revolution led to sectarian warfare in the Muslim world, resulting in Shia-Sunni conflicts.

The U.S. supported Saddam in this war. For Khomeini, the war proved to be a blessing domestically. Instead of questioning his performance and holding him accountable for promises such as non-usury economy, people were occupied with mourning their loved ones' deaths.

In 1988, after Khomeini's death, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei became the leader, and Iran fell into the hands of the clerical son of Sayyid Qutb. In 1994, Khamenei declared himself the source of emulation and faced opposition. Target killing, known as the "chain

killing," was carried out to silence journalists, causing a conflict between President Mohammad Khatami and the leader.

The Shia religious authority in Qom has been going through one of the toughest periods in history. After Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Ayatollah Hasan Qomi, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Rohani, Ayatollah Sayyid Sadiq Rohani, Ayatollah Sayyid Rida Sadr, Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Muhammad Shirazi, and many other Shia scholars became the targets of government criticism and imprisonment.

Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani, Ayatollah Sadiq Rohani, Ayatollah Shabiri Zanjani, and other first-row scholars are under pressure from government journalists and authorities. When Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani advised to maintain good relations with the world, government journalists took him down.

Please note that this translation is a rough interpretation and may not capture all nuances of the original text.

Current Situation in Iran

Even today, Iran operates under a theocratic system. The implementation of Islam has not been successful, and the promises of Ayatollah Khomeini have proven hollow. The educational system also leans towards the Western model. The political system remains similar to the Pahlavi era, with only a change in the ruler's face and attire. Superficial elections are held, resembling the Pahlavi era.

However, some religious restrictions have been imposed on women's clothing by the government, although there is no equivalent in Islamic sources. The religious people of Iran believe that the advent of Islam and the work of Imam Mahdi cannot be achieved through others. However, due to this deception, atheism is spreading among

the Iranian population, posing a greater threat to people's faith than during the Shah's era.

The people do not have the right to protest against power centers; instead, direct bullets are fired. Several journalists read out government narratives on state media. While the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in the struggle against communism with the help of the West, Iran has been successful in preserving its market in the region by preventing economic power similar to Germany, Korea, or Japan from emerging.

The impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution is that there is an inclination in other Muslim countries to establish religious scholars as rulers. This has led to a significant increase in terrorism and sectarian violence in the region. Therefore, it would be unjust to say that there is no conflict between the absolute guardianship of the jurist and the old guardianship of the jurist in the government's sense. This political concept is detrimental to Muslim societies, similar to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Taliban, etc.

All these movements have their roots in the political innovations of Muhammad Rashid Rida, Maududi, and Sayyid Qutb. However, the term "Akhwani Shia" is used to refer to Salafism in Shia, apparently using separate terms. The concept of "Guardianship of Jurists" has been given the name, and the confrontation with modernity is called "Confrontation with Western Civilization," and the turn towards the Sunnah is called "Creating Islamic Civilization from Tradition."

For this reason, the current Iranian system and Hitler's Nazi state have deep similarities. The Persian translation of the term "Führer" is "Rahbar," and Hassan Abbasi is sitting on Goebbels' chair, and the whole structure is protected by the show trials held every year, which sentence hundreds of people to death.

Secular Republic in Iraq (Post-2003)

After 2003, when a new political framework began to emerge in Iraq, the influential Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani expressed support for democracy by rejecting the concept of "Vilayat-e Faqih" (Guardianship of the Jurist). He advised that religious seminaries (Hawzah) should remain limited to scholarly research and the promotion of goodness. Additionally, he distanced himself from the concept of "Vilayat-e Faqih" and opposed Sufism.

This stance by Ayatollah Sistani reflects a more secular and democratic perspective, emphasizing the separation of religious and political authority. It indicates a preference for a system where political power is not concentrated in the hands of a single religious leader, contrasting with the concept of "Vilayat-e Faqih" promoted by some Shia Islamist figures.

Lesson for Pakistan

We should learn a lesson from the failed example of the Islamic system in Iran, which became wealthy from oil and gas but couldn't achieve Islamic ideals. Theocratic rule in Pakistan will bring nothing but coercion, poverty, ignorance, bloodshed, diseases, environmental degradation, and injustice. Afghanistan's example is right in front of us.

For Pakistan, our guidance lies in aligning our religion with the secular vision of the founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Secularism doesn't mean separating religion from politics but keeping religious scholars separate from politics. Secularism means that running the country on modern lines is the work of experts in contemporary sciences, while establishing an Islamic system is the work of Imam Mahdi; nothing will be achieved from the hands of any other group before his arrival.

According to the latest census, the urban population ratio has exceeded 37%, and urbanization is spreading uncontrollably. If, beyond the Taliban mindset, the freedom of expression for everyone else continues to be curtailed, and complaints are suppressed in the name of religious insult, cybercrime laws, and government Islamicization, the growing urban population can pave the way for an ideological revolution. This revolution will be a punishment for the majority, similar to how the Nazi Party coerced the Germans. After that, a wave of atheism will come.

People need to equip themselves with knowledge to counter the misguided aspects of the Islamist revolution and raise awareness among others.

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